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We revisit evidence whether incentives or IFRS drive earnings quality changes, analyzing a 
large sample of German firms in the period from 1998 to 2008. Consistent with previous 
studies we find that voluntary and mandatory adopters differ distinctively in terms of essential 
firm characteristics and that size, leverage, age, bank ownership and ownership concentration 
influenced the decision to voluntarily adopt IFRS. However, regardless of the decision to 
voluntarily adopt IFRS, we find that conditional conservatism increased under IFRS for both 
groups of adopters, while evidence does not suggest an increase in value relevance under 
IFRS. Results on earnings management in the post-adoption period are mixed. While income 
smoothing decreases for voluntary but not for mandatory adopters, discretionary accruals only 
decrease for mandatory but not for voluntary adopters. However, further analyses suggest that 
the capital market environment and the economic cycle during the adoption period seem to be 
a more powerful explanation for this evidence than voluntary or mandatory IFRS adoption. 
Therefore, we conclude that incentives to voluntarily adopt IFRS did not unambiguously 
dominate accounting standards in determining earnings quality in the case of German firms.  
 
JEL Classification: G14, M41, M43, M44, M47  
 
Keywords:  IAS regulation, earnings management, earnings quality, corporate ownership 
structures.   3
1. Introduction 
 
According to EC regulation 1606/2002 companies in the European Economic Area are 
obliged to release their consolidated financial statements under International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS)
1 for fiscal years starting from January 1
st 2005 onwards.
2 This 
regulation was among the factors that turned IFRS into the most widely accepted set of 
accounting standards in the world. However, some companies adopted IFRS on a voluntary 
basis or in compliance with stock exchange regulation before EC regulation became effective. 
Some German global players already adopted IFRS or US GAAP on a voluntary basis in the 
early 90s but were required to continue reporting under HGB. The increasing demand for 
public equity financing and subsequently international accounting standards was met by the 
Capital Raising Facilitating Act (Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterungsgesetz – KapAEG) which 
became effective from 1998. This regulation allowed German parent companies to substitute 
consolidated financial statements under HGB by financial statements prepared according to 
IFRS or US GAAP. This regulation turned Germany into the country with the highest number 
of voluntary IFRS adopters within the European Union.
3 Although the question why these 
firms adopted IFRS and how voluntary vs. mandatory IFRS adoption influences earnings 
quality is of particular interest for the understanding of reporting incentives, it has not entirely 
been answered in academic literature so far.  
Prior work suggests that size, international exposure, dispersion of ownership, and listing 
age were important drivers of voluntary IFRS adoption in Europe (Cuijpers/Buijink, 2005). 
Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) present comparable results for the particular case of Germany. As 
ownership structures have a strong influence on reporting incentives (i.e. Warfield et al. 1995; 
Fan/Wong, 2002; Wang, 2006; LaFond/Roychowdury, 2008), we presume they also should 
have an impact on the decision to voluntarily adopt IFRS. An analysis in this context for the 
German market is of particular interest due to its specifics regarding ownership concentration, 
bank influence and relatively low protection of minority shareholders.
4  
                                                 
1  IFRS refers to the set of standards issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). IAS 
were renamed to IFRS in 2001. We use the expression ‘IFRS’ for both sets of standards, IAS and IFRS. 
2  German companies that are publicly traded both in the European Union and on a regulated third-country 
market and therefore apply another internationally accepted accounting standard (i.e. US GAAP) in their 
consolidated accounts were allowed to defer the application of IFRS until fiscal years starting from January 
1
st 2007 onwards.  
3  Six other EC-countries introduced similar legislation on the adoption of IFRS or US-GAAP (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, and Luxemburg) (cf. Gassen/Sellhorn, 2006, Delvaille et al. 2005). Outside 
the European Economic Area, Switzerland and China had a significant percentage of early voluntary IFRS 
adopters, cf. e.g. Barth et al. (2008). 
4  For a detailed overview on the German financial and corporate governance system, cf. Krahnen/Schmidt 
(2004).   4
The consequences of voluntary IFRS adoption have been subject to numerous studies in 
recent years. Within these studies much attention has been paid to the association between 
accounting standards and financial reporting outcomes like earnings quality (i.e. Barth et al., 
2008; Van Tendeloo/Vanstraelen, 2005; Hung/Subramanyam, 2007). Thereby, it has 
commonly been argued that IFRS adoption leads to reduced information asymmetries 
between investors and companies through increased disclosure and provides higher 
accounting quality. However, previous studies have shown that the adoption of accounting 
standards that are supposed to be of high quality is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for high quality financial reporting (Ball et al. 2003). This is in line with the argument that the 
application of a uniform set of accounting standards does not automatically produce 
consistent financial reporting (i.e. Leuz et al., 2003; Ball, 2006) but that corporate incentives 
and the capital market environment are also important drivers.  
In this context, mandatory IFRS adoption has frequently been referred to as an ideal 
research setting to evaluate the relative influence of standards vs. incentives as determinants 
of accounting quality. This is because mandatory users of IFRS are expected to differ 
decisively from voluntary IFRS adopters in terms of size, capital structure, ownership 
structure and financial reporting sophistication (Schipper, 2005). In a cross-country study 
Ahmed et al. (2009) provide evidence that mandatory IFRS adoption does not unambiguously 
improve accounting quality. They benchmark a sample of firms from 21 countries that 
adopted IFRS in 2005 to a sample from 17 countries that did not adopt IFRS. Christensen et 
al. (2008) use a sample of German firms and find less income smoothing and more timely loss 
recognition under voluntary but not under mandatory IFRS adoption. They conclude that the 
incentive to voluntarily adopt IFRS dominates the effect of accounting standards in 
determining earnings quality. However, with a sample period from 1993 to 2006 their sample 
covers only few IFRS observations for the group of mandatory adopters.  
With this study we shed light on consequences of voluntary vs. mandatory IFRS adoption 
in Germany on income smoothing, discretionary accruals, conditional conservatism and value 
relevance. On the basis of the regulatory setting in Germany we are able to divide voluntary 
and mandatory adopters according to their incentives to voluntarily adopt IFRS and to directly 
observe changes in earnings quality around IFRS adoption for both groups. With a sample 
period from 1998 to 2008 we include a sufficient number of observations in order to observe 
earnings quality changes not only under voluntary but also under mandatory IFRS adoption. 
As the German capital market has evolved significantly during our observation period, 
observations for the pre- and post-adoption periods fall into different capital market   5
environments for voluntary and mandatory adopters. This is why additional analyzes are 
required. 
Concerning the process of voluntary IFRS adoption, we find in line with previous studies 
that size, international exposure, listing age, financial leverage and industry affiliation were 
important drivers of voluntary IFRS adoption in Germany. Analysing the particular influence 
of ownership structures suggests that ownership concentration as well as bank ownership 
were among the factors that had a significant negative impact on the decision to voluntarily 
adopt IFRS.  
In a second step we analyze consequences of voluntary vs. mandatory IFRS adoption, 
which leads to ambiguous evidence on earnings management. Like previous studies we find 
that income smoothing decreases under voluntary but not under mandatory IFRS adoption. 
Discretionary accruals decrease under mandatory but not under voluntary IFRS adoption. 
However, additional analyses suggest that these results are mainly caused by financial market 
developments rather than IFRS standards or voluntary adoption. Conditional conservatism 
increases under IFRS for voluntary as well as for mandatory adopters, while value relevance 
did not change significantly under IFRS, for voluntary or for mandatory adopters. These 
results show that neither voluntary nor mandatory IFRS adoption lead unambiguously to 
higher earnings quality and that capital market phases are an important determinant of 
earnings quality within our sample period.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview on accounting 
internationalization in Germany and reviews existent literature on determinants and 
consequences of IFRS adoption. Section 3 describes data and research design while section 4 
presents the results of our analyses. Within section 5 we summarize our results and provide 
directions for future research.  
 
2. Conceptual underpinnings and previous literature 
2.1 Financial reporting under the German institutional framework 
 
Accounting quality can be regarded as a function of accounting standards, a country’s 
legal and political system as well as reporting incentives. Among the most important reporting 
incentives are financial market development, capital structures, ownership structures and a 
country’s tax system (Soderstrom/Sun, 2007). Germany is traditionally classified as a code-
law country with weak investor protection and high benefits of private information (LaPorta 
et al., 1999 and 2000). Furthermore, the German capital market is characterized by the   6
following stylized factors: (i) stronger insider involvement (Leuz et al., 2003); (ii) financing 
structures relying on bank and internal financing (Gorton and Schmid, 2000; Dittmann et al., 
2009); (iii) less developed markets for corporate control (Wenger/Kaserer, 1998; Köke, 
2004); (iv) more conservative accounting systems (i.e. Daske et al., 2008); and (v) less 
pronounced enforcement of accounting standards (Hope, 2003).  
The German corporate governance structure is reflected by its national accounting 
standards system, the German Commercial Code (HGB) which is a creditor- and stakeholder-
orientated as well as a tax-influenced accounting system (i.e. Harris et al., 1994; Hung, 2001; 
Leuz/Wüstemann, 2004). Main objectives of this set of accounting standards are to preserve 
equity, protect creditors and facilitate the calculation of taxable accounting income (Van 
Tendeloo/Vanstraelen, 2005). Consequently, the HGB underlies a conservative approach 
concerning the recognition and measurement of assets and liabilities, an approach which relies 
on easy-to-verify information and which overall facilitates the generation of hidden reserves. 
In contrast, the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are a shareholder-
orientated accounting system that is stemmed from common law country regimes like the US 
or the UK. Financial statements prepared under IFRS shall provide a true and fair view into 
the firm’s financial and economic position and facilitate decision making for investors. This is 
why effects of IFRS adoption in non-Anglo-Saxon economies like Germany are of particular 
interest (Hung/Subramanyam, 2007).  
Differences between HGB and IFRS have been examined in previous studies. One 
approach to assess the extent of differences between the two accounting systems is the use of 
reconciliations according to IFRS 1. Hung and Subramanyam (2007) find that switching from 
HGB to IFRS results in significant changes to deferred taxes, pensions, property, plant and 
equipment as well as loss provisions and higher cross-sectional variation in net income. Total 
assets and book value of equity are found to be significantly larger under IFRS than HGB. 
Similarly, Beckman et al. (2007) suggest that reconciling items show a tendency of German 
firms to write off assets immediately and to accrue provisions in excess of those allowed 
under international reporting standards. Both studies indicate that German firms tend to use 
hidden reserves in order to smooth earnings.  
Increased financing needs of German firms are partly considered to be a result of the 
German reunification in 1990. As a consequence, a row of reforms, like the KapAEG (Capital 
Raising Facilitating Act) or the BilKoG (Accounting Enforcement Act) have been undertaken 
in order to move the German financial system into the direction of an arms-length transaction 
system (Leuz/Wüstemann, 2004) because investors have become an important user group of   7
financial statements. Furthermore, the German government undertook efforts in recent years 
in order to make the German corporate governance system more transparent to outside 
investors through increased disclosure (i.e. by the German Corporate Governance Code) and 
to improve enforcement of accounting standards (i.e. by setting up an enforcement institution 
under private law, the ‘Deutsche Prüfstelle für Rechnungslegung’, cf. section 342b HGB). 
However, recent evidence by Ernstberger et al. (2008) suggests that these regulatory efforts 




2.2 Determinants of IFRS adoption: the impact of ownership structures 
 
The understanding of incentives to adopt IFRS is crucial to evaluate the association 
between accounting standards and reporting outcomes. However, only few studies have 
focused on determinants of voluntary IFRS adoption, especially in code law countries. Gassen 
and Sellhorn (2006) show that size, international exposure and listing age had a positive 
influence, while a high percentage of closely held shares had a negative influence on the 
probability of voluntary IFRS adoption in Germany. This evidence is supported by 
Christensen et al. (2008) who find that firms who resisted IFRS adoption until 2005 have 
more concentrated ownership structures (measured by the proportion of closely held shares), a 
higher proportion of bank ownership (measured as the percentage of shares owned by banks 
and trusts as reported by Thomson Ownership for December 2004), more leverage and less 
analyst following. In addition, companies which have not adopted IFRS voluntarily tend to be 
smaller, older, more profitable (return on assets) and dispose of a lower degree of 
internationalization as compared to voluntary adopters. Using a sample of European firms 
which released their annual accounts for the year 1999 under non-local GAAP, Cuijpers and 
Buijink (2005) find that a US-listing, a listing at the EASDAQ, more geographically dispersed 
operations and lower local financial reporting quality are drivers of the adoption of 
international accounting standards, namely IFRS or US GAAP.  
Although ownership structures are likely to differ between voluntary and mandatory IFRS 
adopters (Schipper, 2005), the influence of certain types of investors and the percentage of 
shares held by these investors has not been examined in previous studies.  
This is of particular interest in the case of an economy that is characterized by high 
ownership concentration with blocks held by different shareholder groups like Germany, as 
                                                 
5  For a detailed overview about German reforms on enforcement of IFRS and economic consequences 
  resulting from these reforms cf. Ernstberger et al. (2008).   8
concentrated ownership structures facilitate communication between firms and investors via 
private information channels (Burgstahler et al. 2006). Hence, the use of these private 
communication channels might be perceived by investors with insider orientation or large 
stakes to be more efficient than the adoption of a new set of standards, while emphasis on the 
use of financial statements might be put on its contracting function. Controlling shareholders 
could believe that any benefit that arises from IFRS adoption would be less than the cost to 
implement and transit to the new set of standards (Armstrong et al., 2008). Hence, we suppose 
that the demand for IFRS is generally lower for firms with concentrated ownership structures. 
German firms heavily rely on bank debt and internal financing. But banks do not only 
play a role as creditors in Germany, they also frequently hold stocks in German firms and act 
as trustees for the funds of small investors. Furthermore, the fact that banks frequently hold 
positions as representatives on supervisory boards (Leuz/Wüstemann, 2004) gives them the 
role of quasi insiders.
6 As banks can be supposed to have superior access to company 
information (either through debt contracts or through their role as insiders) and a particular 
interest to maintain a creditor-orientated accounting system, we expect bank ownership to 
have a negative impact on voluntary IFRS adoption.  
Firms with high insider ownership face less capital market pressure and should therefore 
have lower incentives to adopt an investor orientated accounting system. Furthermore, as 
managers as well as members of supervisory boards have superior possibilities to access 
company information, they could try to avoid costs associated with the transition to a new set 
of accounting standards. Hence, one could suggest that insider ownership delays IFRS 
adoption. However, considering information asymmetries between inside and outside 
shareholders, outside shareholders could demand higher transparency through IFRS and 
therefore urge firms with a significant proportion of insider ownership to adopt IFRS. Firms 
with insider ownership might as well take IFRS adoption into account when they aim at an 
increase in capital either by issuing new shares or selling (part of) their stake. Taken together, 
the influence of insider ownership on voluntary IFRS adoption is unclear. 
In order to contribute to the discussion whether IFRS is able to reduce equity home bias, 
we examine the relationship between foreign ownership and IFRS adoption in Germany. 
Foreign investors face information costs when they have to become familiar with financial 
statements prepared by foreign companies. The adoption of an internationally accepted set of 
accounting standards like IFRS could reduce information processing costs and hence help 
                                                 
6  Dittmann et al. (2009) present evidence that banks help German non-financial firms to overcome financing 
boundaries but do not act in the interest of other shareholders even if they hold a stake in the firm 
themselves.   9
reduce home bias. Covrig et al. (2007) show that foreign ownership increases in companies 
that adopt international accounting standards. However, Beneish and Yohn (2008) argue that 
although information costs are likely to be material to individual investors this might not hold 
to be true for large institutional investors. Another factor is uncertainty about the quality of 
financial reporting in foreign countries. Evidence from previous studies indicates that IFRS 
increase decision usefulness of financial statements which is why IFRS adoption could also 
increase earnings quality in a non-Anglo-Saxon environment (Leuz, 2003; Bartov et al., 2005; 
Barth et al. 2008). However, investors could make a discount to the use of international 
financial standards if these are weakly implemented and enforced. Taken together, also the 
question whether IFRS adoption was appreciated by foreign investors in Germany is 
unanswered. 
 
2.3 Determinants of earnings quality: incentives vs. standards 
 
Previous studies have found that besides standards incentives and institutional factors are 
important drivers for financial reporting outcomes (Joos/Lang, 1994; Ball et al., 2000; 
Ali/Hwang, 2000; Ball et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003). Within the debate on accounting 
harmonization much attention has been paid to the relationship between the use of 
international accounting standards and earnings quality (Ashbaugh/Pincus, 2001; Asbaugh, 
2001; Van Tendeloo/Vanstraelen, 2005; Barth et al., 2008).  
Before EU regulation became effective, outside shareholders could criticize that discretion 
provided by the German accounting system to smooth earnings for tax avoidance purposes 
using hidden reserves as well as explicit accounting choices together with low disclosure 
requirements result in rather uninformative financial reporting outcomes (Leuz/Verrecchia, 
2000). In contrast, IFRS have fewer explicit accounting choices and high disclosure 
requirements as they are meant to lead to financial reporting outcomes that meet the 
information needs of analysts and investors. However, it should be noted that IFRS allow for 
a higher amount of implicit accounting choices that can be used in order to enhance or reduce 
the information content of earnings. Dobler (2008) concludes that possibilities to engage in 
earnings management do not necessarily decrease under IFRS as compared to HGB. This 
suggests that the impact of IFRS on earnings management is an open empirical question. 
Previous studies on the impact of IFRS adoption on earnings management focus on the 
dimensions of discretionary accruals and income smoothing. Using a sample of German 
firms, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) provide evidence that voluntary IFRS adoption   10
is not associated with less earnings management in terms of discretionary accruals when 
compared to non-adopters, although there is a decrease in income smoothing among IFRS 
adopters. Similarly, Goncharov and Zimmermann (2007) find that earnings management does 
not decrease under IFRS but under US GAAP as compared to HGB. Barth et al. (2008) 
examine the impact of IFRS adoption on income smoothing using an international sample of 
voluntary IFRS adopters. German firms constitute a significant proportion of firms used in 
their analysis (about 20%). They find that firms who voluntarily adopt IFRS engage in less 
income smoothing compared to the period when firms reported under national GAAP. 
Christensen et al. (2008) use a similar research design like Barth et al. (2008) and compare the 
extent of income smoothing in the pre- and post-adoption period for voluntary and mandatory 
IFRS adopters in Germany. They find that income smoothing decreased significantly under 
voluntary but not under mandatory IFRS adoption.  
We re-examine and enlarge evidence on earnings management from previous studies 
comparing income smoothing and discretionary accruals for voluntary and mandatory IFRS 
adopters in the pre- and post-adoption period among German firms. Within our observation 
period, HGB and IFRS observations for voluntary and mandatory adopters fall into different 
capital market phases. Sufficient firm-year observations allow us to analyze the influence of 
an evolving financial market environment on earnings management.  
Conditional conservatism is another dimension that is supposed to characterize high 
quality earnings
7 and which has frequently been referred to in previous studies on IFRS 
adoption and earnings quality. According to Basu (1997) conservatism is interpreted as 
capturing accountant’s tendency to require a higher degree of verification for recognising 
good rather than bad news in earnings. This is why bad news tend to be reflected on a timelier 
basis in financial statements than good news. Building on the timing and sequencing of gains 
and losses with respect to their associated cash flows the resulting measures of conservatism 
are based on the extent to which the earnings-return association is stronger during periods of 
negative returns relative to periods of positive returns (Givoly/Hayn 2000, Givoly et al., 
2004).  
Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) use a matched sample of German firms and find that 
conditional conservatism is higher for IFRS firms than for HGB firms. Similarly, Barth et al. 
(2008) find that voluntary IFRS adopters report earnings on a timelier basis in the post than in 
the pre-adoption period. Besides the Basu (1997) measure for conditional conservatism, they 
run logistic regressions in order to evaluate whether firms report large negative losses more 
                                                 
7  For a detailed overview on conservatism, cf. Watts (2003).    11
frequently in the post- than the pre-adoption period. Christensen et al. (2008) closely follow 
the methodology in Barth et al. (2008) and find an increase in conditional conservatism in the 
post-adoption period for voluntary but not for mandatory IFRS adopters. While evidence on 
conditional conservatism is quite consistent across previous studies, evidence on mandatory 
IFRS adoption needs to be revisited as IFRS observations for mandatory adopters are scarce 
in previous studies.  
Besides earnings management and conditional conservatism, previous studies frequently 
focussed on value relevance in order to draw standard setting inferences building on the 
association of accounting numbers and stock market data (Holthausen/Watts, 2001; Barth et 
al. 2001). Bartov et al. (2005) compare value relevance under HGB, IFRS and US GAAP for 
a sample of listed German firms. They find that value relevance is more pronounced under 
international financial reporting standards (IFRS or US GAAP) than under HGB. Similarly, 
Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) find value relevance to be somewhat higher for IFRS adopters 
compared to non-adopters, but this difference is not significant. For an international sample of 
voluntary IFRS adopters, Barth et al. (2008) find that value relevance is higher in the post- 
than in the pre-adoption period. Hung and Subramanyam (2007) use a different approach to 
examine value relevance under HGB compared to IFRS. They analyze reconciliations of net 
income and shareholder’s equity from HGB to IFRS and find that book value of equity and 
net income are no more relevant under IFRS than under HGB.  
IFRS adoption appears particularly beneficial to firms if investors consider IFRS as being 
informative and resulting in high quality accounting income. Firms could then use the 
adoption of IFRS as a signalling mechanism through committing themselves to higher 
financial reporting requirements and more transparency. On the other side, investors could 
also doubt the positive effects of IFRS adoption if they believe that IFRS fails to or does not 
adequately reflect Germany’s particularities including political and economic features. 
Investors could also believe that an insufficient implementation and enforcement of IFRS 
might lead to enhanced opportunistic managerial discretion when firms report under IFRS. 
This is consistent with evidence provided by Armstrong et al. (2008) who find that stock 
market reactions on IFRS adoption are weaker in European code-law than common-law 
countries. They presume that this result is due to concerns over enforcement. Kaserer and 
Klingler (2008) show for the accrual anomaly, that introducing true and fair view accounting 
standards, like IFRS, that rely on hard-to-verify-information might not necessarily be 
appropriate to improve the information content of earnings under the German institutional 
framework. As previous evidence on IFRS adoption and the information content of earnings   12
is mixed, the question whether IFRS leads to more value relevant earnings under voluntary vs. 




We start our sample selection process identifying all German corporations whose common 
stock
8 is listed in the Composite German stock index (CDAX).
9 Our sample period starts in 
1998 as due to the KapAEG publicly traded German corporations were allowed to prepare 
consolidated financial statements under international accounting standards (IFRS or US 
GAAP) instead of German GAAP (HGB) for the first time. This has two central implications 
for our empirical analysis. First, as firms which adopted IFRS before the KapAEG were 
forced to incur the costs of dual or parallel reporting, it can be assumed that these adopters 
differ systematically from firms choosing IFRS after the issuance of this act. Second, a 
sufficient number of firms applying international accounting standards could not be observed 
before this point in time.
10 Furthermore, 1998 is the first year in which a full set of IFRS 
became available and firms that chose IFRS had to fully comply with these standards. As we 
analyze (i) the impact of ownership characteristics on the probability of voluntary IFRS 
adoption and (ii) consequences of voluntary vs. mandatory IFRS adoption on earnings quality, 
we eliminate all firms that apply US GAAP within the sample period. We also exclude bank 
and insurance companies as well as other financial services companies from our analysis.
11 In 
order to assure that observations are not biased by different stock market regulations
12, we 
only include firm-year observations in which the stock is actually listed in the CDAX. 
Following the argument proposed by Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) we do not exclude firm-year 
observations due to requirements by the German stock exchange concerning mandatory 
application of international accounting standards in special market segments (New Market 
                                                 
8  We only include firms with listed common stock in our analysis as non-listed common shares might bias our 
results due to different ownership structures. In a few cases firms are listed with more than one class of 
common shares in the index. In this case we include the share class with the higher proportion of nominal 
capital.  
9  Focussing on the CDAX, the market segment that comprises the EU regulated market mitigates influences 
of regulatory differences that arise between the regulated and the open market (Freiverkehr). The CDAX is a 
market segment of the German stock exchange set up in 1993. For an exact index definition of the CDAX 
cf. http://deutsche-boerse.com. 
10  Based on the information provided by the Worldscope database, only 9 German firms (thereof 7 non-
financial firms) listed in the CDAX adopted IFRS prior to 1998.  
11  The identification of firms from financial services industries is based on the ICB industry classification in 
Thomson Financial Datastream. 
12  Regulatory differences arise between the EU regulated and the open market, see Fn. 9.   13
firms) as firms could switch to other segments.
13 The sample period ends in the year 2008 
which was the last year with available ownership, accounting and capital market information 
when constructing the dataset.
14 For analyzes concerning the impact of ownership 
characteristics on voluntary IFRS adoption a sub-sample is built, which ends by the year 
2004, the last period in which firms could voluntarily adopt IFRS.  
Based on this sampling procedure we are able to identify 543 non-financial firms (3697 
firm-year observations) whose annual reports were published under German GAAP or 
IFRS.
15 The sample selection process is reported in table 1, panel A.  
 
– Insert table 1 about here – 
 
Panel B of table 1 shows the distribution of accounting standards followed by voluntary 
and mandatory IFRS adopters. Voluntary adopters are defined as firms which adopted IFRS 
no later than 2004, while mandatory adopters are those companies who did not apply IFRS 
before 2005. Our analysis includes 2160 firm-year observations for voluntary and 1537 firm-
year observations for mandatory IFRS adopters. The proportion of IFRS to HGB observations 
is unequally distributed among the two groups, with 322 HGB and 1838 IFRS firm-year 
observations for voluntary compared to 1088 HGB and 449 IFRS observations for mandatory 
IFRS adopters.  
The core data on ownership structures is derived from Hoppenstedt Aktienführer which 
publishes annual data on ownership structures of publicly listed German firms. In order to 
verify ownership information we use several further databases: Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus 
database,  Commerzbank’s Wer gehört zu wem, the director dealings database of the 
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht and web research. Accounting data used in 
our analyzes comes from Worldscope database
16, while capital market data comes from the 
Thomson Financial Datastream database. 
 
 
                                                 
13  However, we run additional analyses to assess whether the inclusion of New Market firms in our sample 
affects our results. 
14  As fiscal year’s end does not always correspond to calendar year end, firm-year observations with fiscal 
year’s end starting from July 1
st of the actual year to June 30
th of the following year are allocated to the 
actual calendar year. For the year 2008 our dataset only includes data on financial statements available until 
20
th October 2009. German firms need to file their annual reports within four months according to German 
law, while the German Corporate Governance Code recommends firms to file their annual reports within 
three months. Therefore, firm-year observations for the year 2008 should by widely complete. 
15  For the sub-sample from 1998 to 2004 the sample corresponds to 479 firms (2,461 firm-year observations). 
16  Note that as the data quality concerning the applied accounting standard is quite low in the Worldscope 
database we verified this critical information using annual reports.   14
4. Methodology 
4.1 The impact of ownership characteristics on voluntary IFRS adoption 
 
Following and extending prior research on the adoption of non-local GAAP we perform 





( ) 1 ( 4 3 2 1 0
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Within our analysis we consider the following ownership dimensions.  
Ownership concentration: Ownership concentration is measured using the aggregate amount 
of shares owned by the three biggest shareholders (CONC).
18  
Bank ownership: Bank ownership (Bank) is defined as the cumulated amount of stock 
  owned by German banks.  
Foreign investments: The variable ‘foreign investments’ (FI) comprises the percentage  of 
  stock held by non-German investors.
19  
Insider ownership: Insider ownership (IO) aggregates all block holdings owned by actual 
  and former directors (members of the management or supervisory board) of the firm. 
 
In order to assure that our findings concerning the impact of differences in ownership 
structures on voluntary adoption of IFRS are not biased by omitted variables, we control for 
factors influencing the adoption decision (CV) known from previous studies. Following 
Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) we expect larger firms with more geographically dispersed 
operations by trend to have a higher probability to switch to international accounting 
standards than smaller firms. Therefore we control for (1) firm size (Size) and (2) international 
exposure (Internationalization). Size is defined as natural logarithm of total assets at fiscal 
                                                 
17  IFRS accounts thereby comprise the labels ‘International standards’, ‘International standards and some EEC 
guidelines’ and ‘IFRS’ in the Worldscope database (WC07536). The classifications ‘Local standards’, 
‘Local standards with some EEC guidelines’ and ‘Local standards with EEC and IASC guidelines’ are 
aggregated to German GAAP (HGB) accounts. The regression is also performed separately for each of the 
considered ownership characteristics. 
18   As a robustness check, a Herfindahl index which is calculated as the sum of the squared shares owned by 
blockholders and the percentage of closely held shares (WC08021) are used as alternative concentration 
measures in our analysis. 
19  It therefore aggregates all block investments of the following investor groups: Non German banks, non 
German institutional investors, foreign venture capital and private equity investors, foreign endowment 
funds, non German corporations and business groups, foreign governments and foreign insurance 
companies.   15
year’s end (WC02999). International exposure is measured by the fraction of sales which are 
achieved outside the home market (WC0701/WC01001). In line with Gassen and Sellhorn 
(2006) who show that firms which adopt IFRS have primarily an IPO date post 1995, we 
control for (3) the listing years (Listing Years) of a firm. In particular this variable is defined 
as the difference between the considered year t and the IPO year.
20  
Using a sample of European firms, Cuijpers and Buijink (2005) find that a US-listing 
plays a predominant role in explaining the voluntary adoption of non-local GAAP. In contrast 
to their study which also includes US GAAP firms, we expect that European listings are most 
likely to influence IFRS adoption because European stock exchanges have become more 
favorable towards IFRS in the period of our study.
21 Therefore, we include (4) an indicator 
variable (European Listing) which equals one if the firm is listed on a European stock 
exchange outside Germany and zero otherwise.
22  
We also include (5) growth (Growth) measured by the percentage change in sales (WC 
01001) into our model as growth firms can be expected to have a higher tendency to 
voluntarily adopt IFRS. As Germany is a country with relatively low investor protection we 
expect that outside creditors (like i.e. banks) will urge corporations to apply the creditor 
orientated accounting system, namely HGB and therefore reduce the probability of voluntary 
IFRS adoption. As the Worldscope database does not deliver bank debt explicitly, we use (6) 
leverage defined as total debt (WC03255) divided by total assets (WC02999) as a proxy.
23 We 
account for the influence of industry affiliations including industry fixed effects in our 
regression.
24 To control for year fixed effects, we also include year dummies in our 
regression. 
Additionally, we analyze the impact of ownership and firm characteristics on the timing of 
IFRS adoption using the following binary logistic regression. 
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20  The information concerning the IPO year is derived from Hoppenstedt Aktienführer. 
21  Note, that results not tabulated in this study based on our dataset suggest that firms that adopt IFRS are more 
frequently listed on European than on US stock exchanges.  
22  Data on the yearly listing status of our sample firms again comes from Hoppenstedt Aktienführer. 
23  Note that this seems quite reasonable as a test for a sub-sample of Prime Standard firms for the year 2003 
(which is the first year of the Prime Standard as the transparency standard with the highest disclosure 
requirements in Germany) shows that the correlation between hand collected bank debt from annual reports 
and total leverage as reported by the Worldscope database is about 0.8. 
24  Industry fixed effects are calculated using the ICB industry classification in Thomson Financial Datastream.   16
The indicator variable Early equals one for annual accounts released by firms that adopted 
IFRS before 2002 and zero otherwise. All other variables in equation (2) are defined as in 
equation (1). The intention behind this equation is to analyze whether firms adopting IFRS 
before the issuance of EC regulation 1606/2002 differ from those who adopted IFRS at a later 
point in time. 
 
4.2 Consequences of voluntary vs. mandatory IFRS adoption on earnings quality 
4.2.1 Earnings Management 
 
At first, we follow Barth et al. (2008) as well as Christensen et al. (2008) and analyze 
effects of voluntary vs. mandatory IFRS adoption on income smoothing. Previous literature 
suggests that a higher variability of earnings is associated with fewer income smoothing (Leuz 
et al., 2003; Lang et al., 2006; Barth et al., 2008). As German firms are presumed to use 
accruals in order to smooth earnings, especially under HGB (Beckman et al., 2007), we 
suggest an analysis of the extent of income smoothing under HGB vs. IFRS to be of particular 
interest. To avoid idiosyncratic effects mentioned by Aussenegg et al. (2008), we use six 
different measures for income smoothing which are partly modified compared to previous 
studies.   
Our first measure for income smoothing is based on the variability of change in net 
income scaled by average total assets (Lang et al., 2006). We assume a smaller variance of the 
change in net income as evidence for a greater extent of income smoothing. However, as 
change in net income is sensitive to various factors that cannot be attributed to the accounting 
system, we extend and modify the approach used by Lang et al. (2006) and Barth et al. 
(2008). Therefore, in our second measure we consider the variance of the residuals from a 
pooled regression of the absolute change in net income on variables identified as factors 
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In contrast to previous studies, we use the absolute change in net income as dependent 
variable, as we consider the extent rather than the direction of change in net income to be   17
explained by changing incentives around IFRS adoption.
25 Based on our findings on the 
factors influencing voluntary IFRS adoption, we control for ownership concentration, size, 
leverage,  international exposure,  listing years as well as industry and year fixed effects. 
Additionally, we control for factors used in related studies adapted to our measurement 
approach. Therefore, we control for absolute growth which is defined as the absolute 
percentage change in sales. CF is annual net cash flow from operating activities. Turn is sales 
divided by average total assets. Again, we include year dummies to control for year fixed 
effects. Our third measure for income smoothing is the ratio of the variability of change in net 
income ∆NI over the variability of the change in cash flows ∆CF. As suggested by Barth et al. 
(2008) we expect firms with volatile cash flows to have more volatile net income. Again, we 
measure this ratio by (i) the variance of ∆NI divided by the variance of ∆CF and (ii) using the 
residuals from equations (3) and (4) (measure four). Following our deliberations for the 
second measure, equation (4) is modified compared to previous studies by using the absolute 
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Our fifth measure to examine the extent of income smoothing is based on the Spearman 
correlation coefficient between accruals and cash flows. If accruals are used to smooth 
earnings, a more negative correlation between accruals and cash flows should occur. As with 
the measures above we use (a) the raw variables CF and ACC as well as (b) the residuals from 
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25  As equation (3) explains the change of a flow variable by both stock and flow variables, not taking the 
absolute values for the flow variables overestimates the residuals of the equation as the stock variables are 
not able to explain the direction of the dependent flow variable.  
26  As the dependent variables in equation (5) and (6) are not defined as changes from period t-1 to period t, we 
now take the initial values for the variables.    18
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To test for differences in the pre- and post-adoption period we estimate equations (3) to 
(6) pooling observations for the whole observation period for voluntary and mandatory 
adopters.
27 In a second step, we derive the metrics for each period by classifying the residuals 
according to the applied accounting standard. To test for statistical significance we run F-tests 
for measures one and two and standard tests using Fisher’s z for measures five and six. 
Additionally, we follow Barth et al. (2008) and Christensen et al. (2008) applying t-tests 
based on the empirical distribution of the differences between the pre- and post-adoption 
period for metrics one to four. In order to obtain our distribution of the differences between 
the respective metric in the pre- and post-adoption period, we run a simulation modelling the 
distribution of the basic population. Therefore, we randomly select nPre firm-year observations 
for the particular group in the pre and nPost firm-year observations in the post-adoption period 
with replacement (bootstrapping), whereby nPre and nPost equals the number of observations of 
the group in the respective period. This procedure is repeated 1,000 times.  
Our second measure to examine the influence of IFRS adoption on earnings management 
is discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals are estimated cross-sectionally in each year 
and each industry
28 based on the model proposed by Ball and Shivakumar (2006)
29 instead of 
the modified Jones-model as applied by Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) as well as 
Goncharov and Zimmermann (2007).  
To test the relation between IFRS adoption and earnings management separately for 
voluntary and mandatory adopters, absolute discretionary accruals (ABS_ACCt) are used as 
dependent variable in equation (7). 
 
                                                 
27  I.e. to test for differences concerning income smoothing by voluntary adopters in the pre- and post-adoption 
period we pool all observations which belong to the group of voluntary adopting firms.  
28  In contrast to Ball/Shivakumar (2006) discretionary accruals are estimated based on ICB-Codes instead of 
three-digit SIC-codes.  
29   Discretionary accruals are estimated using the following regression:  
 ACCt=α0+ α1*CFt+ α2*CFt-1+ α3*CFt+1+ α4*DCFt+ α5*DCFt*CFt+εt, where: ACCt is total accruals at t, scaled 
by average total assets at t; total accruals are earnings before extraordinary items minus operating cash flows; 
CFt is operating cash flows at t, scaled by average total assets at t; CFt-1 is operating cash flows at t-1, scaled 
by average total assets at t; DCFt is one if the change in cash flows at t is less than zero, and zero otherwise; 
the interaction term DCFt* CFt serves as proxy for economic losses. 
   19
it
it it
it it it t
ffects YearFixedE
xedEffects IndustryFi Years Listing RoA
Lev Growth Size IFRS ACC ABS
ε
α α
α α α α α
+ +
+ ⋅ + ⋅ +
⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + + =
6 5
4 3 2 1 0 _
    ( 7 )  
 
4.2.2 Conditional Conservatism 
 
We use two models to analyze conditional conservatism in the pre and post IFRS adoption 
period for voluntary and mandatory adopters. Our first model relies on the specification for 
timely loss recognition by Basu (1997) that builds on the transitory nature of economic 
income (Samuelson, 1965; Fama, 1970). In this model conditional conservatism corresponds 
to the difference between the slope coefficient on negative returns and the slope coefficient on 
positive returns (Gassen/Sellhorn, 2006). To test for differences between the pre and post-
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In contrast to Basu (1997), NI is net income scaled by average total assets instead of the 
market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year. We follow this approach, as the 
sample period covers a sub-period of extreme market values, which might bias our results. R  
is defined as the annual buy-and-hold return ending four months after fiscal year end, d is an 
indicator variable which equals one if the return R is negative and zero otherwise. IFRS is a 
dummy variable which equals one for firm-year observations in the post-adoption period and 
zero for observations in the pre-adoption period. As in our analysis on earnings management 
we control for factors (CV) which cannot be attributed to the accounting system in our 
analysis on conditional conservatism.
30 Following the argument in Basu (1997) we expect that 
earnings are timelier in reflecting publicly available ‘bad news’ than ‘good news’. Therefore 
we expect ß5 to be positive. A higher incremental coefficient on bad news in the post-adoption 
period (ß6>0) is consistent with more timely loss recognition after IFRS adoption.  
Our second model to examine conservatism is the accruals-based model as introduced by 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) in order to mitigate potential limitations associated with Basu’s 
                                                 
30    In particular we control for the following factors: size, leverage, listing years, growth, cash flow and 
turnover.   20
serial dependence model. Based on the approach by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) our second 
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The indicator variable d equals one if the cash flow of firm i in period t is negative and 
zero otherwise. In contrast to the model used in Ball and Shivakumar (2005) accruals (ACC) 
are directly derived from cash flow statements instead of balance sheets. Accordingly, in our 
model accruals are defined as the difference between net income and cash flow from 
operations.
31 As in Ball and Shivakumar (2005) we predict a positive incremental coefficient 
5 ß  for negative cash flows, following the hypothesis that accrued losses are more likely in 
periods of negative cash flows. We do not offer any prediction for the intercept 0 ß , 
respectively the dummy specific intercept. More timely loss recognition in the post-adoption 
period in this model is marked by  6 ß >0. 
 
4.2.3 Value Relevance 
 
The last earnings quality dimension we consider in our study is the association between 
either stock prices or returns and accounting numbers. Following Barth et al. (2001), higher 
explanatory power of accounting data for prices or returns is interpreted as higher accounting 
quality. We use three measures proposed in prior research to examine value relevance for 
voluntary and mandatory adopters in the pre- and post-adoption period. As for income 
smoothing, discretionary accruals and conditional conservatism we run pooled OLS 
regressions separately for voluntary and mandatory adopters. Again, we include control 
variables (CV) into our models to capture the influence of changing incentives around IFRS 
adoption.
32   
                                                 
31  Referring to the work of Hribar and Collins (2002), we suppose that the cash flow measure provided by the 
cash flow statement via the Worldscope database is more accurate than a measure that is derived from 
balance sheet data. 
32   In the value relevance models we use the following control variables: size, leverage, listing years, growth, 
turn and market-to-book ratio. We run additional analyses adding a beta factor derived from the CAPM 
using all non-financial firms listed in the CDAX as portfolio as additional explanatory variable for stock 
data into our analyses. This approach leads to a loose of quite some observations and results remain 
unchanged, we do not tabulate this additional analysis.     21
Our first measure modifies the approach suggested in Warfield et al. (1995), which tests 
for the cross-sectional variation in the earnings coefficient (the slope coefficient from a 
regression of returns on earnings). The fact that we include an interaction term considering the 
IFRS adoption leads to the following equation (10). 
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it R  denotes the return of firm i for the annual period t ending four months after fiscal 
year’s end, NIPS (WC05201) is earnings per share,  1 , − t i P  is price per share four months after 
fiscal year end of period t-1. A higher value relevance of accounting numbers in the post-
adoption period is consistent with a regression coefficient  3 α > 0. 
The second model (Equation 11) is based on Lang et al. (2003, 2006) and regresses equity 
book value per share BVPS (WC05476) and net income per share NIPS  on the industry 
adjusted price  it P * of firm i four months after fiscal year’s end.
33 Following Lang et al. (2006) 
and Brown et al. (1999) we deflate regression variables by the stock price at the end of period 
t-1 to mitigate scale effects that can occur if samples differ in terms of general share price 
levels. Higher value relevance of accounting numbers after IFRS adoption is marked by  4 α >0 
and  5 α >0 respectively. 
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Our third value relevance model examines the proportion of stock returns that can be 
explained by net income  it NI  and change in net income  it NI ∆  as applied by Francis and 
Schipper (1999) and Gassen and Sellhorn (2006). As in all our other models, net income and 
change in net income are scaled by average total assets,  it R  is annual buy-and-hold returns 
ending four months after fiscal year’s end, in order to assure that accounting information can 
be accessed by the capital market. Equation (12) describes the model. 
 
                                                 
33  Following Barth et al. (2008) Pit* is defined as the residual of a regression of the price of firm i four months 
after fiscal year end (Pit), on industry dummies. To calculate the industry dummies we again use the ICB 
industry classification from Thomson Financial Datastream.   22
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As in model two more value relevant accounting numbers are indicated by  4 α >0 and 
5 α >0 respectively. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 provides an overview on how firms who voluntarily adopted IFRS and those who 
resisted IFRS adoption differ in terms of ownership structures and other firm characteristics. 
In order to assure that our results are not biased towards bigger more visible firms each 
variable is considered with as many observations as possible, resulting in different numbers of 
observations.  
 
– Insert table 2 about here – 
 
Panel A describes the properties of firms which are classified as voluntary adopters, Panel 
B reports data for mandatory adopters. In order to assess whether differences are dependent 
on the distribution of accounts released under HGB vs. IFRS, summary statistics are reported 
separately for both accounting standards. First of all, it becomes obvious that voluntary IFRS 
adopters have less concentrated ownership structures than mandatory IFRS adopters.
34 Bank 
ownership is higher for mandatory than for voluntary IFRS adopters while insider ownership 
does not differ significantly between both groups. Surprisingly, mandatory IFRS adopters 
have a significant higher proportion of foreign ownership compared to voluntary IFRS 
adopters. This result holds true in the pre- as well as in the post-adoption period. This result 
might be explained by the fact that these investors are long-term orientated investors with 
rather large stakes and that firms seeking equity financing from US investors adopted US 
GAAP rather than IFRS.  
Voluntary IFRS adopters also differ decisively from mandatory IFRS adopters in terms of 
other firm characteristics. They have less listing years, more sales growth, are more frequently 
                                                 
34   Not tabulated results using a Herfindahl-index or closely-held shares instead of the percentage held by the 
three largest shareholders as a proxy for ownership concentration do not alter our results.     23
listed at European stock exchanges, underlie more international exposure in terms of foreign 
sales and have less financial leverage.
35 
Overall, our descriptive statistics suggest that voluntary and mandatory IFRS adopters 
differ essentially in terms of central firm characteristics that could have an impact on earnings 
quality. Therefore, we control for main differences between voluntary and mandatory IFRS 
adopters in our analyses on earnings quality.  
 
5.2. Determinants of voluntary IFRS adoption in Germany 
 
The results of our analysis on the impact of ownership structures on voluntary IFRS 
adoption are reported in tables 3a and 3b. The logistic regressions confirm impressions gained 
from the descriptive statistics. 
 
– Insert tables 3a and 3b about here – 
 
Both tables show that ownership concentration significantly delayed IFRS adoption even 
if we control for certain shareholder types. This evidence confirms our suggestion that 
controlling shareholders rely on private information channels and avoid costs associated with 
the transition to a new set of standards.
36 As expected, bank ownership was among the factors 
that significantly delayed IFRS adoption. We suppose this to be a result of the quasi insider 
role played by banks in the German economy. Considering the fact that banks do not only 
play a role as investor but also act as creditors, the impact of leverage on voluntary IFRS 
adoption additionally has to be taken into account. We find that a high proportion of debt to 
total assets (leverage) also significantly delayed IFRS adoption. Insider ownership has no 
significant influence on voluntary IFRS adoption, neither for the whole sample nor for the 
sub-sample of early voluntary IFRS adopters. Foreign ownership was among the factors that 
had a significant negative impact on early IFRS adoption. This result can be explained by the 
fact that concerns over enforcement and over implementation of IFRS were particularly high 
in the early adoption phase. In a separate analysis not reported in this paper, we also found 
foreign investors to hold rather large stakes when invested in German companies. Hence, they 
                                                 
35  In contrast to previous studies we find that voluntary adopters are only significantly larger in the pre-
adoption period. When analyzing the median, we find that mandatory adopters are significantly larger in the 
post-adoption period. This might be due to the fact that we use total assets instead of market capitalization 
of equity as a measure for size.   
36  This evidence holds true for all our measures for ownership concentration: (i) the aggregate amount held by 
the three largest shareholders, (ii) the Herfindahl index and (iii) the proportion of closely held shares.   24
might prefer to rely on alternative information channels rather than IFRS for information 
purposes, especially under the conditions of a weak corporate governance system. If foreign 
investors are long-term investors they might as well have gained expertise with financial 
statements derived under HGB.
37  
Furthermore, we find similar firm characteristics to have a significant influence on voluntary 
IFRS adoption as previous studies. We document that larger firms, with more international 
exposure and less listing years are more likely to voluntarily adopt IFRS. 
 
5.3. Consequences of voluntary vs. mandatory IFRS adoption in Germany 
5.3.1 Earnings Management 
 
Table 4a presents our results comparing income smoothing for voluntary and mandatory 
IFRS adopters in the pre and post-adoption period. The variability of changes in net income, 
measured by the raw variable as well as the residuals, increases significantly in the post-
adoption period for voluntary IFRS adopters. This change is highly significant under the F-
test and the t-test (simulation) and suggests that voluntary IFRS adopters engage in less 
income smoothing in the post-adoption period. One explanation for this result could be the 
fact that voluntary adopters are much more heterogeneous in terms of size than mandatory 
adopters.
 The group of voluntary adopters does not only comprise some very large and well 
established firms but also a certain amount of young high growth firms which went public in 
the period from 1998 to 2000 and had more volatile earnings (the group of so-called New 
Market firms).
 38 Similar results to the variability in change in net income can be derived from 
our analysis of the variability of earnings over cash flows and the correlation between 
accruals and cash flows.
39  
 
– Insert table 4a about here – 
 
However, we find quite different results on income smoothing by mandatory IFRS 
adopters. All six measures denote a higher extent of income smoothing in the post-adoption 
                                                 
37  The results could be explained by the fact that foreign investors especially US-investors might prefer to 
invest in companies that apply US GAAP instead of IFRS. These observations are excluded from our 
analysis.   
38  For this reason, we repeat our analysis excluding all firms that went public within the period from 1998 to 
2000. Not tabulated results show that this reduces the extent of the decrease in income smoothing among 
voluntary adopters, but that the results remain robust by trend for all our measures on income smoothing.  
39  Note that not modifying the measures for income smoothing used in Barth et al. (2008) and Christensen et 
al. (2008) does not alter our results.    25
period, whereby only measure (1), the variability of change in net income is significant at a 
95%-level. Therefore, we conclude that by trend mandatory adopters slightly engage in more 
income smoothing after IFRS adoption. These results are similar to those in Christensen et al. 
(2008).  
However, descriptive statistics not tabulated suggest that the period of voluntary IFRS 
adoption is characterized by a financial market environment where earnings were particularly 
volatile which suggests that our results could be driven by a time trend. Therefore, we conduct 
further sensitivity analyses in order to assess the robustness of these results.  
 
– Insert table 4b about here – 
 
At first, we repeat our analyses for the variability of change in net income for a balanced 
panel. For this analysis we limit the observations to firms for which data is available the year 
before and after IFRS adoption, and in a second step to firms for which data is available two 
years before and after IFRS adoption.
40 This analysis indicates by trend that income 
smoothing did not decrease but rather increase under IFRS for voluntary adopters.
41 In a 
second step, we compare income smoothing among voluntary and mandatory IFRS adopters 
for the period from 2005 to 2008 and find that both groups do not differ significantly in terms 
of income smoothing according to most measures (cf. table 4b, panel A). This indicates that 
voluntary and mandatory adopters do not differ if comparable market phases are considered. 
Our third robust check where we pretend that voluntary IFRS adopters did not adopt IFRS 
before 2005 (cf. table 4b, panel B) supports this notion. In this analysis we find the same trend 
on income smoothing as compared to mandatory IFRS adopters suggesting an increase 
instead of a decrease in income smoothing after IFRS adoption. Therefore, we conclude that 
the findings in table 4a are more likely to be a result of different capital market environments 
than of voluntary or mandatory IFRS adoption.  
Discretionary accruals between voluntary and mandatory IFRS adopters are compared in 
table 5.  
 
– Insert table 5 about here – 
 
                                                 
40  This approach allows us to directly observe the adoption effect, whereby each firm in the pre-adoption 
period serves as control for the post-adoption period. However, it has to be mentioned that this reduces the 
number of observations to a great extent. 
41   To save space results are not tabulated.   26
Table 5, panel A shows, consistent with Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), that 
discretionary accruals did not decrease significantly under voluntary IFRS adoption but rather 
increase by trend.
42 However, there is a significant decrease in discretionary accruals under 
mandatory IFRS adoption (cf. table 5, panel C). As suggested by not tabulated descriptive 
statistics discretionary accruals were particularly low in the period of mandatory IFRS 
adoption. Therefore, evidence on discretionary accruals could also be caused by a time trend 
rather than IFRS adoption. When we repeat our regression analyzes adding an interaction 
term that analyzes the additional impact of IFRS observations for voluntary adopters that fall 
into the period from 2005 to 2008 (cf. table 5, panel B), we also find a significant decrease in 
discretionary accruals for this group (90%-level).  
Overall, we conclude that earnings management did not decrease under IFRS among 
German firms regardless whether IFRS are applied on a voluntary or mandatory basis but that 
corporate incentives to manage earnings differ between the periods of voluntary (1998 to 
2004) vs. mandatory adoption (2005 to 2008).  
 
5.3.3 Conditional Conservatism 
 
Table 6 presents our results concerning changes in conditional conservatism for voluntary 
and mandatory IFRS adopters in the pre and post-adoption period.
 43  
 
– Insert table 6 about here – 
 
We find similar results for voluntary and mandatory adopters. For model (1), the Basu 
(1997) serial dependence model, the regression coefficient  6 β  shows no incremental 
improvement concerning the consideration of ‘bad news’ in the post-adoption period for 
voluntary and mandatory adopters. In contrast, for model (2), the accruals based model by 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) which overcomes potential limitations of model (1),  6 β  
documents an increase in conditional conservatism from the pre to the post IFRS adoption 
period at a significance level of 99% for voluntary and 95% for mandatory adopters. This 
result suggests that IFRS might indeed lead to an increase in conditional conservatism 
regardless of voluntary or mandatory IFRS adoption among German listed firms. These 
                                                 
42   We find the same result when we exclude New Market firms from our analysis, although discretionary 
accruals are generally lower when New Market firms are excluded.  
43   Again, our results are not affected by the fact that New Market firms are included in our sample.    27
results are in line with previous studies on effects of voluntary IFRS adoption, but contrast 
previous evidence on effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on conditional conservatism.  
 
5.3.4 Value Relevance 
 
Table 7 shows our results for value relevance.
44 For voluntary adopters, we find that value 
relevance slightly improved in the post-adoption period when model (2) is used (cf. table 7, 
panel A). This is marked by  5 α >0 at a significance-level of 90%. Value relevance is 
unaffected by mandatory IFRS adoption under model (2) (cf. table 7, panel B). Model (1) and 
(3) denote that value relevance remains unchanged (α3, respectively α4 and α5 not significantly 
different from zero) after IFRS adoption for both groups.  
 
– Insert table 7 about here – 
 
By and large, these results suggest that value relevance did not clearly increase or 
decrease after IFRS adoption no matter whether IFRS was chosen on a voluntary or a 
mandatory basis. This finding is consistent with the argument that hard-to-verify information 
used in true and fair view accounting systems might not be a suitable mean to increase the 
information content of accounting data in the German capital market.  
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
 
The enactment of EC regulation 1606/2002 provides a unique setting to evaluate the 
effectiveness of IFRS adoption on improvements of financial reporting. Focussing on a single 
country study, we keep the institutional framework constant which allows us to observe 
directly whether incentives or IFRS standards were drivers of earnings quality in Germany.  
The first purpose of our study was to enhance our understanding of determinants of 
voluntary IFRS adoption in Germany. Like previous studies we find that size, leverage and 
age were important firm characteristics that influenced the decision to voluntarily adopt IFRS. 
Focussing on the impact of ownership structures, we find that ownership concentration and 
bank ownership negatively influenced voluntary IFRS adoption in Germany. Interestingly, 
foreign ownership has been a factor that delayed IFRS adoption among early adopters. This 
could be explained by the fact that these foreign investors hold rather large stakes in German 
                                                 
44   Additional analysis without New Market firms leads to similar results.    28
firms and might therefore consider private communication channels as being more efficient 
than IFRS adoption. As we presume that these investors are long-term orientated, there were 
apparently no efforts to attract further investors through IFRS adoption.  
The second purpose of our study was to assess consequences of voluntary vs. mandatory 
IFRS adoption on earnings quality. Barth et al. (2008) find more timely loss recognition and 
less earnings smoothing under IFRS across countries. Their evidence is contrasted by Ahmed 
et al. (2009) who find that income smoothing increases and conditional conservatism 
decreases under IFRS. The results of these studies are not contradictory as Barth et al. (2008) 
focus on voluntary adopters while results in Ahmed et al. (2009) are stemmed from 
mandatory adopters. For voluntary adopters however, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) 
find that discretionary accruals are not affected significantly by IFRS adoption, although there 
is a decrease in income smoothing among German firms that voluntarily adopt IFRS. In a 
subsequent study Christensen et al. (2008) find a decrease in income smoothing and an 
increase in timely loss recognition for voluntary but not for mandatory adopters among 
German firms. They suggest that mandatory adopters could perceive fewer benefits from a 
shareholder orientated set of accounting standards and thus avoid costs to transit to IFRS. 
They presume that in contrast to voluntary adopters mandatory adopters not only had a lack of 
incentives to adopt IFRS but also to improve earnings quality.  
In contrast to previous studies, we find that conditional conservatism increases under 
IFRS for both groups of adopters when measured by the approach as in Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005). For earnings management, we find a decrease in income smoothing by voluntary but 
not for mandatory IFRS adopters while we find no decrease in discretionary accruals under 
voluntary but under mandatory IFRS adoption.
45 However, additional analyses suggest that 
voluntary and mandatory IFRS adopters do not diverge with regard to these measures for 
earnings management. Hence, we presume that this evidence is rather explained by the impact 
of financial market developments and economic cycles rather than IFRS standards or the 
decision to voluntarily adopt IFRS. Concerning the value relevance of accounting numbers, 
we find no significant improvement for voluntary as well as for mandatory adopters in the 
post-adoption period. These findings are in line with evidence provided by Gassen and 
Sellhorn (2006) and the notion in Kaserer and Klingler (2008) that accounting standards that 
rely on hard-to-verify information do not necessarily improve accounting quality under code 
law regimes like Germany.  
                                                 
45  Discretionary accruals have not been analyzed under mandatory IFRS adoption in previous studies.     29
On the whole, we find evidence which is in line with previous studies but suggest that this 
evidence crucially depends on the proxies used for earnings quality and that our results on 
earnings management, measured by income smoothing and discretionary accruals, are 
particularly sensitive to the capital market environment and economic cycles during the 
adoption phase. Finally, this implies that evidence on earnings quality under IFRS found in 
previous studies should be interpreted with caution.  
 
   30
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Panel A: Earnings Management by Voluntary Adopters Sample Period: 1998-2008
Variable Pred. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant ? 0.096*** (0.010)
IFRS ? 0.003 (0.004)
Size - -0.007*** (0.002)
Lev ? -0.020** (0.009)
Age - -0.000 (0.0004)
Growth - -0.007** (0.003)
ROA - -1.023*** (0.201)
Conc ? 0.004 (0.006)
adj. R² 0.149
N1 3 1 1
Panel B: Earnings Management by Voluntary Adopters considering time trend
Variable Pred. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant ? 0.096*** (0.010)
IFRS ? 0.005 (0.004)
d*IFRS ? -0.005* (0.003)
Size - -0.007*** (0.002)
Lev ? -0.020** (0.009)
Age - -0.000 (0.00003)
Growth - -0.007** (0.003)
ROA - -0.992*** (0.203)
Conc ? 0.002 (0.006)
adj. R² 0.15
N1 3 1 1
Panel C: Earnings Management by Manadatory Adopters
Variable Pred. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant ? 0.104*** (0.019)
IFRS ? -0.008** (0.003)
Size - -0.008*** (0.003)
Lev ? 0.003 (0.011)
Age - -0.0001** (0.00004)
Growth - -0.005 (0.007)
ROA - -0.823** (0.329)
Conc ? 0.001 (0.007)
adj. R² 0.08
N8 5 7
Note: The model to measure the impact of IFRS on absolute discretionary accruals is defined as follows:
ABS_ACC it=ß 0+ß 1·IFRS it+CV+ε it
  
Table 5
Earnings Management by Voluntary and Mandatory Adopters  
The variables are defined as follows: 
ABS_ACC are absolute discretionary accruals measured by the approach by Ball and Shivakumar (2005). IFRS is a dummy variable which equals 
one if the firm-year observation belongs to the post adoption period and zero otherwise.  CV denotes the following included control variables. Size, 
defined as the natural logarithm of total assets at fiscal year´s end at t; Lev is total debt divided by average total assets at t; age, which is firm age in 
years; Growth, as the relative difference of sales in periode t and period t-1; ROA, which is return on assets calculated as earnings before interest 
and tax (EBIT) divided by total assets. Conc, defined as the aggregate amount of shares owned by the three biggest shareholders.  Standard errors 
are clustered, White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. *** / ** / * indicates a two-tailed significance level of 99% / 95% / 90%.  43
P
a
n
e
l
 
A
:
 
T
i
m
e
l
y
 
L
o
s
s
 
R
e
c
o
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
 
b
y
 
V
o
l
u
n
t
a
r
y
 
A
d
o
p
t
e
r
s
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
P
e
r
i
o
d
:
 
1
9
9
8
-
2
0
0
8
P
r
e
d
.
C
o
e
f
.
S
t
d
.
 
E
r
r
.
P
r
e
d
.
C
o
e
f
.
S
t
d
.
 
E
r
r
.
ß
3
?
0
.
0
3
5
*
*
0
.
1
5
4
ß
3
-
-
0
.
7
3
7
*
*
*
0
.
0
8
4
6
ß
5
+
0
.
0
7
1
0
.
0
5
1
ß
5
+
0
.
0
4
6
0
.
1
4
4
ß
6
+
0
.
0
7
7
0
.
0
5
4
ß
6
+
0
.
5
4
0
*
*
*
0
.
1
7
3
ß
5
+
ß
6
+
0
.
1
4
8
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
4
ß
5
+
ß
6
+
0
.
5
8
7
*
*
*
0
.
1
4
8
ß
3
+
ß
5
+
ß
6
+
0
.
1
8
3
*
*
*
0
.
0
3
0
a
d
j
.
 
R
²
0
.
3
8
4
a
d
j
.
 
R
²
0
.
3
4
4
N
1
6
2
2
N
1
7
3
4
P
a
n
e
l
 
B
:
 
T
i
m
e
l
y
 
L
o
s
s
 
R
e
c
o
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
 
b
y
 
M
a
n
d
a
t
o
r
y
 
A
d
o
p
t
e
r
s
P
r
e
d
.
C
o
e
f
.
S
t
d
.
 
E
r
r
.
P
r
e
d
.
C
o
e
f
.
S
t
d
.
 
E
r
r
.
ß
3
?
0
.
0
0
2
0
.
0
1
ß
3
-
-
0
.
5
6
4
*
*
*
0
.
0
7
7
ß
5
+
0
.
1
4
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
1
ß
5
+
-
0
.
0
4
3
0
.
1
3
1
ß
6
+
-
0
.
0
4
6
0
.
0
4
9
ß
6
+
0
.
4
5
6
*
*
0
.
1
8
5
ß
5
+
ß
6
+
0
.
0
9
7
*
*
0
.
0
4
7
ß
5
+
ß
6
+
0
.
4
1
3
*
0
.
1
8
0
ß
3
+
ß
5
+
ß
6
+
0
.
0
9
9
*
*
0
.
0
4
9
a
d
j
.
 
R
²
0
.
3
7
4
a
d
j
.
 
R
²
0
.
3
2
3
N
1
1
3
0
N
1
1
6
0
N
o
t
e
:
 
T
h
e
 
m
o
d
e
l
s
 
t
o
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
 
t
i
m
e
l
y
 
l
o
s
s
 
r
e
c
o
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
 
a
r
e
 
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
 
a
s
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
s
:
 
 
M
o
d
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R
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R
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R
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r
i
a
b
l
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d
e
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i
n
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o
l
l
o
w
s
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R
i
s
t
h
e
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n
n
u
a
l
b
u
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-
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-
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l
d
s
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o
c
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r
e
t
u
r
n
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n
d
i
n
g
4
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n
t
h
s
a
f
t
e
r
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c
a
l
y
e
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r
e
n
d
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P
*
i
s
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h
e
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n
d
u
s
t
r
y
a
d
j
u
s
t
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d
p
r
i
c
e
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o
u
r
m
o
n
t
h
s
a
f
t
e
r
f
i
s
c
a
l
y
e
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r
e
n
d
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I
F
R
S
i
s
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n
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
w
h
i
c
h
e
q
u
a
l
s
o
n
e
i
f
t
h
e
f
i
r
m
-
y
e
a
r
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
b
e
l
o
n
g
s
t
o
t
h
e
p
o
s
t
a
d
o
p
t
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n
p
e
r
i
o
d
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n
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z
e
r
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o
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h
e
r
w
i
s
e
.
N
I
P
S
i
s
n
e
t
i
n
c
o
m
e
p
e
r
s
h
a
r
e
.
P
i
s
t
h
e
P
r
i
c
e
f
o
r
m
o
n
t
h
s
a
f
t
e
r
f
i
s
c
a
l
y
e
a
r
e
n
d
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B
V
P
S
i
s
t
h
e
b
o
o
k
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
e
q
u
i
t
y
p
e
r
s
h
a
r
e
.
N
I
i
s
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
a
s
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
b
e
f
o
r
e
e
x
t
r
a
o
r
d
i
n
a
r
y
i
t
e
m
s
d
e
f
l
a
t
e
d
b
y
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
t
o
t
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
.
C
V
d
e
n
o
t
e
s
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
:
S
i
z
e
,
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
a
s
t
h
e
n
a
t
u
r
a
l
l
o
g
a
r
i
t
h
m
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
a
t
f
i
s
c
a
l
y
e
a
r
e
n
d
;
L
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
,
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
a
s
t
o
t
a
l
d
e
b
t
d
i
v
i
d
e
d
b
y
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
t
o
t
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
;
L
i
s
t
i
n
g
y
e
a
r
s
,
w
h
i
c
h
i
s
t
h
e
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
y
e
a
r
t
a
n
d
t
h
e
I
P
O
y
e
a
r
;
G
r
o
w
t
h
,
w
h
i
c
h
i
s
t
h
e
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
o
f
s
a
l
e
s
i
n
p
e
r
i
o
d
e
t
a
n
d
p
e
r
i
o
d
t
-
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;
M
T
B
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
a
s
t
h
e
m
a
r
k
e
t
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
e
q
u
i
t
y
a
t
f
i
s
c
a
l
y
e
a
r
e
n
d
d
i
v
i
d
e
d
b
y
b
o
o
k
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
e
q
u
i
t
y
a
t
f
i
s
c
a
l
y
e
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r
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n
d
.
T
u
r
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o
v
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r
,
w
h
i
c
h
i
s
s
a
l
e
s
d
i
v
i
d
e
d
b
y
a
v
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r
a
g
e
t
o
t
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
.
A
d
d
i
t
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o
n
a
l
l
y
,
w
e
c
o
n
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r
o
l
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r
I
n
d
u
s
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r
y
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n
d
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e
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r
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i
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d
E
f
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c
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n
d
u
s
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r
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F
i
x
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E
f
f
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c
t
s
a
r
e
b
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I
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s
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y
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c
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c
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o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
.
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c
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c
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c
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d
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d
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c
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p
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P
e
r
i
o
d
:
 
1
9
9
8
-
2
0
0
8
P
r
e
d
.
C
o
e
f
.
S
t
d
.
E
r
r
.
P
r
e
d
.
C
o
e
f
.
S
t
d
.
E
r
r
.
P
r
e
d
.
C
o
e
f
.
S
t
d
.
E
r
r
.
α
2
+
0
.
2
4
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
3
0
2
α
2
+
1
.
0
1
2
0
*
*
*
0
.
1
2
8
α
2
+
0
.
7
2
3
*
0
.
3
9
3
α
3
?
-
0
.
1
2
4
0
.
1
2
3
α
3
+
0
.
6
3
9
0
.
4
2
6
α
3
+
1
.
3
7
6
 
0
.
4
4
6
α
4
?
0
.
1
7
5
0
 
.
1
3
4
α
4
?
-
0
.
2
6
1
0
.
4
1
1
α
5
?
1
.
1
5
7
*
0
.
6
8
2
α
5
?
-
0
.
5
4
8
 
0
.
4
6
9
α
2
+
α
3
+
0
.
1
1
8
0
.
0
8
4
α
2
+
α
4
+
1
.
1
8
7
*
*
*
0
.
1
8
α
2
+
α
4
+
0
.
4
6
3
*
*
*
0
.
1
5
3
α
3
+
α
5
+
1
.
7
9
6
*
*
*
0
.
6
5
1
α
3
+
α
5
+
0
.
8
2
8
*
*
*
0
.
1
6
3
a
d
j
.
 
R
²
0
.
3
9
5
a
d
j
.
 
R
²
0
.
5
2
3
a
d
j
.
 
R
²
0
.
4
3
5
N
1
6
1
6
N
1
6
8
8
N
1
5
7
2
P
a
n
e
l
 
B
:
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
R
e
l
e
v
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
A
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
s
 
b
y
 
M
a
n
d
a
t
o
r
y
 
A
d
o
p
t
e
r
s
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
P
e
r
i
o
d
:
 
1
9
9
8
-
2
0
0
8
P
r
e
d
.
C
o
e
f
.
S
t
d
.
E
r
r
.
P
r
e
d
.
C
o
e
f
.
S
t
d
.
E
r
r
.
P
r
e
d
.
C
o
e
f
.
S
t
d
.
E
r
r
.
α
2
+
0
.
1
5
7
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
1
α
2
+
1
.
7
2
0
*
*
*
0
.
1
4
2
α
2
+
1
.
0
0
9
*
*
*
0
.
2
6
4
α
3
?
0
.
1
3
1
0
.
1
3
8
α
3
+
-
0
.
2
1
8
0
.
4
4
0
α
3
+
0
.
3
7
0
0
.
2
3
5
α
4
?
-
0
.
0
9
3
0
.
1
8
8
α
4
?
-
0
.
4
7
2
0
.
3
1
8
α
5
?
1
.
4
2
0
1
.
2
6
1
α
5
?
-
0
.
2
0
3
0
.
3
8
0
α
2
+
α
3
+
0
.
2
8
8
*
*
0
.
1
3
6
α
2
+
α
4
+
1
.
6
2
8
*
*
*
0
.
1
9
6
α
2
+
α
4
+
0
.
5
3
7
*
*
*
0
.
1
6
9
α
3
+
α
5
+
1
.
2
0
2
1
.
2
5
6
α
3
+
α
5
+
0
.
1
6
7
0
.
3
0
4
a
d
j
.
 
R
²
0
.
2
5
7
a
d
j
.
 
R
²
0
.
7
3
3
a
d
j
.
 
R
²
0
.
2
4
1
N
1
1
3
2
N
1
1
2
0
N
1
1
4
7
N
o
t
e
:
 
T
h
e
 
M
o
d
e
l
s
 
t
o
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
r
e
l
e
v
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
s
 
a
r
e
 
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
 
a
s
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
s
:
M
o
d
e
l
 
(
1
)
:
 
R
i
t
 
=
α
0
+
α
1
·
I
F
R
S
i
t
+
α
2
·
(
N
I
P
S
i
t
/
P
i
,
t
-
1
)
+
α
3
·
I
F
R
S
i
t
·
(
N
I
P
S
i
t
/
P
i
,
t
-
1
)
+
C
V
+
ε
i
t
M
o
d
e
l
 
(
2
)
:
 
P
*
i
t
=
α
0
+
α
1
·
I
F
R
S
i
t
+
α
2
·
B
V
P
S
i
t
+
α
3
·
N
I
P
S
i
t
+
α
4
·
I
F
R
S
i
t
·
B
V
P
S
i
t
+
α
5
·
I
F
R
S
i
t
·
N
I
P
S
i
t
+
C
V
+
ε
i
t
M
o
d
e
l
 
(
3
)
:
 
R
i
t
 
=
α
0
+
α
1
·
I
F
R
S
i
t
+
α
2
·
N
I
i
t
+
α
3
·
∆
N
I
i
t
+
α
4
·
I
F
R
S
i
t
·
N
I
i
t
+
α
5
·
I
F
R
S
i
t
·
∆
N
I
i
t
+
C
V
+
ε
i
t
T
h
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
 
a
s
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
s
:
 
R
i
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
b
u
y
-
a
n
d
-
h
o
l
d
s
t
o
c
k
r
e
t
u
r
n
e
n
d
i
n
g
4
m
o
n
t
h
s
a
f
t
e
r
f
i
s
c
a
l
y
e
a
r
e
n
d
.
P
*
i
s
t
h
e
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
a
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
p
r
i
c
e
f
o
u
r
m
o
n
t
h
s
a
f
t
e
r
f
i
s
c
a
l
y
e
a
r
e
n
d
.
I
F
R
S
i
s
a
n
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
w
h
i
c
h
e
q
u
a
l
s
o
n
e
i
f
t
h
e
f
i
r
m
-
y
e
a
r
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
b
e
l
o
n
g
s
t
o
t
h
e
p
o
s
t
a
d
o
p
t
i
o
n
p
e
r
i
o
d
a
n
d
z
e
r
o
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
.
N
I
P
S
i
s
n
e
t
i
n
c
o
m
e
p
e
r
s
h
a
r
e
.
P
i
s
t
h
e
P
r
i
c
e
f
o
r
m
o
n
t
h
s
a
f
t
e
r
f
i
s
c
a
l
y
e
a
r
e
n
d
.
B
V
P
S
i
s
t
h
e
b
o
o
k
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
e
q
u
i
t
y
p
e
r
s
h
a
r
e
.
N
I
i
s
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
a
s
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
b
e
f
o
r
e
e
x
t
r
a
o
r
d
i
n
a
r
y
i
t
e
m
s
d
e
f
l
a
t
e
d
b
y
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
t
o
t
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
.
∆
N
I
i
s
N
e
t
I
n
c
o
m
e
i
n
p
e
r
i
o
d
t
m
i
n
u
s
N
e
t
I
n
c
o
m
e
i
n
p
e
r
i
o
d
t
-
1
.
C
V
d
e
n
o
t
e
s
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
i
n
c
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u
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b
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n
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h
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n
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r
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o
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r
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t
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o
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a
l
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t
f
i
s
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r
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;
L
e
v
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r
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g
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d
e
f
i
n
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d
a
s
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o
t
a
l
d
e
b
t
d
i
v
i
d
e
d
b
y
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
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o
t
a
l
a
s
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;
L
i
s
t
i
n
g
y
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w
h
i
c
h
i
s
t
h
e
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
y
e
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r
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a
n
d
t
h
e
I
P
O
y
e
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r
;
G
r
o
w
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h
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w
h
i
c
h
i
s
t
h
e
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
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o
f
s
a
l
e
s
i
n
p
e
r
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o
d
e
t
a
n
d
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e
r
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t
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M
T
B
d
e
f
i
n
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d
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s
t
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e
m
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r
k
e
t
v
a
l
u
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f
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u
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c
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n
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r
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h
i
c
h
i
s
s
a
l
e
s
d
i
v
i
d
e
d
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y
a
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r
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t
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l
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i
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n
a
l
l
y
,
w
e
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
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r
I
n
d
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s
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y
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n
d
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r
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d
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f
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.
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